The War in Spain: a weekly summary. No. 42

              THE WAR IN SPAIN
A WEEKLY SUMMARY
EDITED BY CHARLES DUFF   UNITED EDITORIAL LTD.
No. 42   LONDON, 5th NOVEMBER, 1938   PRICE 1d.
BELLIGERENT RIGHTS: A WARNING TO BRITAIN
AN attempt is being made to prepare the way for the grant of belligerent rights to the Spanish "Nationalists." In accordance with recent Whitehall practices, the press is being "inspired" and already The Times and the Observer have made quite categorical statements on the subject. On October 29th the Diplomatic Correspondent of The Times wrote: "In the Non-Intervention Committee's plan of withdrawal, agreed to in London on July 5th by the Powers concerned, limited belligerent rights were to be granted to both sides immediately after the withdrawal of a 'substantial number of volunteers' (fixed at 10,000) had been withdrawn from the side with the greater number. As 10,000 Italians have now been withdrawn, and as the Republicans have disbanded their volunteers, it may be presumed that belligerent rights will not be long delayed." (Our italics.) On October 30th the Observer wrote as follows: "It is likewise to be expected that belligerent rights will now be conceded to the two sides in Spain. Though the technical procedure is complicated, the real difficulty (in common with many other difficulties) is removed by the British decision to accept Italy's evacuation of 10,000 men as satisfying the criterion of a 'settlement.' By the terms of the Non-Intervention Committee's proposed scheme, as further defined last July, belligerent rights were to be granted when 10,000 men had been evacuated from the side with the fewest volunteers and a proportionate number from the other side. The interest attaching to the resultant problem is now only academic. When Dr. Negrin announced the Republican decision to evacuate all the volunteers from their side —the 'smaller' side in the matter of volunteers —he shrewdly and intentionally placed upon Italy the theoretic necessity of evacuating all her troops from Spain to satisfy the condition of a 'proportionate' evacuation. As telescopes are often served by the blind eye, so the British Government will put its blind eye to its own proposal and, after inviting the advice of the Non-Intervention Committee, will proceed to grant belligerent rights, whatever that advice may be."   (Again our italics.)
The two newspapers, it will be seen, agree on one point: that the way is already prepared for the grant of belligerent rights, and, whereas The Times gives a totally inaccurate interpretation of the resolution of the Non-Intervention Committee on July 5th, without explaining why it gives this obviously inaccurate interpretation, the Observer is perfectly frank about it. Neither newspaper makes the slightest effort to explain that if the British Government's policy (as they have stated it) is true, then our Government is once more about to behave in a hypocritical and dastardly manner as regards the Spanish Government.
Apparently, whatever the Non-Intervention Committee may decide, Mr. Chamberlain is determined to proceed with a policy calculated to help the Spanish rebels, Herr Hitler, and Signor Mussolini.
First, let us be quite clear what is categorically stated in the text of the resolution adopted by the International Committee for the application of the Agreement regarding Non-Intervention in Spain at the Plenary Session held on July 5th, 1938,* paragraphs 192-3: The participating Governments agree that the International Committee shall have authority on their behalf to adopt a resolution placing on record their opinion that "the arrangements for the withdrawal of foreign nationals are working satisfactorily and that this withdrawal has, in fact, made substantial progress" when 10,000 volunteers have been evacuated in the manner prescribed (in para. 16) from whichever party the Joint Commission in their report 
find to have the smaller number of volunteers, and consequently when a proportionately larger number of foreign volunteers have been SIMILARLY EVACUATED FROM THE SPANISH PARTY FOUND BY THE JOINT COMMISSION IN THE REPORT REFERRED TO ABOVE TO HAVE THE LARGER NUMBER OF VOLUNTEERS.
* Stationery Office publication: Spain No. 1 (1938).   Cmd. 5793. Price 1s. 3d.
This is quite clear and the warning is there. It may be taken for granted from all that has appeared in the press that the policy of the British Government is to ride roughshod through the Non-Intervention Committee's agreement of July 5th in order to implement the ratification of the Anglo-Italian Pact. The Spanish "Nationalists" are to be given belligerent rights, to help them to achieve by starvation a victory which neither their own arms nor those sent by Hitler and Mussolini approached.
What will the grant of belligerent rights to the rebels mean to British interests in the Mediterranean ? It is necessary to recall what happened in that sea before the Nyon anti-Piracy Agreement was put into force. The German and Italian fleets— especially the latter —intervened actively on behalf of the "Nationalists" and showed not the slightest respect for British shipping. With the grant of belligerent rights to Franco, no merchant ship, whatever its nationality, which attempts to carry cargo to or from loyalist Spain will be safe from attack. All possibility of lawful traffic might be ended, but for one factor: the Spanish Government's fleet is superior to that of the rebels, and one may rest assured that it will act. It will fight to protect the shipping which brings food for the hungry and suffering fathers and mothers, brothers and sisters of its personnel. Peace in the Mediterranean will be ended, with obvious results to the vast tonnage of British shipping sailing those waters and representing a British life line. The cost of every commercial product which Great Britain obtains from the East will rise; everything we send there will also increase in price to its purchasers. This means both a rise in the cost of living in England and a decline in our East-bound trade. How many millions of pounds sterling it will mean of dead loss to this country remains to be seen and for Mr. Chamberlain to explain away.
One may ask what proof is there that the Spanish Government's Navy is superior to that of the rebels at this moment ? The answer is simple. On land General Franco has taken about sixty miles of the Mediterranean littoral, thereby separating loyalist Spain into two zones with only the air and the sea as lines of communications between them. The divided portions of Government Spain have established between themselves an excellently controlled sea route. Foodstuffs, war materials, whole brigades of troops move from one to the other, and there is even a passenger service at 25 pesetas a head. A submarine mail service carries important letters and so forth. The mere existence of this traffic is sufficient to show that the Government Navy is adequate to prevent anything in the nature of a blockade being effected by Franco's Navy operating alone. Below we give a statement of the respective strength of the two fleets. The Government Navy has been reconditioned throughout, its personnel intensively trained, and it has skillful officers provided by the new Naval College created by the Government. Those officers and men have proved their worth already in two actions, in the first of which they sunk a vastly superior warship to any they possessed, namely, the Baleares, and in the second of which their destroyer Jose Luis Diez fought seven rebel ships and escaped to Gibraltar after a gallant action in which she was all but sunk. Mussolini, realising the superiority of the loyalist fleet over that of the rebels, presented the latter with some reinforcements, and his own submarines became pirates until the Nyon Agreement stopped them.
The grant of belligerent rights to the rebels will have the results already mentioned —grave results for British shipping. But there are other results even more serious. Belligerent rights at sea for Franco amount virtually to a grant of belligerent rights in the Mediterranean to Hitler and Mussolini, whose warships and submarines may be expected to use their power on behalf of the rebel cause. How is the British Navy to prevent the sinking of British ships all over the Mediterranean by German and Italian units unless patrolling is quadrupled ?— with a consequent increase in cost to the taxpayers here, and even then no guarantee of safety for our ships. To say the least, 
(Continued overleaf)